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Introduction
The 'gay rights in Israel' section of the gaytlvguide.com website promoting gay life and culture in Israel narrates Israel as '… one of the world's most progressive countries in terms of equality for sexual minorities… by far the most tolerant Middle Eastern country towards homosexuals ' (gaytlvguide, 2015) . The narrative further positions Israel as a gay-friendly Western national-civilisational edifice entails powerful emotive power precisely because of its fantasmatic nature, the impossible-possibility of a future in which desire is satisfied and the national body is whole (Berlant, 1991; Edelman, 1998 Edelman, , 2004 Edkins, 2003) . Jouissance is key here as the national-civilisational fantasy promises the always-already lost enjoyment of wholeness and security, which, being an impossibility, is then shunted on to the Other (Mandelbaum, 2016) .
More specifically, I maintain that the current Zionist narrative of being a 'PROUD Israeli' is able to interpellate queer populations in Israel through a process of double and ambiguous identification, that is, through a process of introjection and projection (Freud, 1921 (Freud, /2001 ; see also Dolar, 1993, pp. 80-81) . Taken together, introjection and projection can help us understand how queer populations within Jewish-Israeli society come to identify with Israel's national chain of significations and how Israel, through this homonational self-legitimation, subject positions itself in tandem with the 'liberal' West and in contra-distinction to the 'homophobic anti-liberal' Middle-East. Projection comes into play in this process of contradistinction. Israel projects, and thus 'washes', its own exclusionary practices onto the Other, the Arab/Muslim Middle-East. The insecurity of the Jewish-Israeli body national, and indeed the insecurity of the queer body, is rendered discursively secure, although only partially, through the projection of insecurity onto the illiberal Arab/Muslim. This article, therefore, seeks to further strengthen our understanding of the role queer inclusivity/'tolerance' plays in nation-building and state-legitimation (Britt, 2015; Hochberg, 2010; Kunstman, 2008; Puar, 2007) , how such queer inclusions work through 'intimate investment' (Agathangelou et al., 2008) and how they may lead to 'murderous inclusions' (Elia, 2012; Haritaworn et al., 2013; Ritchie, 2010) .
The article has two main parts, following Puar's (2013b) suggestion to read homonationalism as 'viral'. In the first part, I review key post-structuralist theories of nationalism/national belonging, focusing on gendered readings of nation-building and Puar's homonationalism analytic. Drawing on those poststructuralist readings, I then present the Lacanian psychoanalytical framework and delineate the categories of fantasy, desire and jouissance, as well as introjection and projection, to explain the affective power of nationalcivilisational narratives. My key argument in this section is that the impossible-possibility of the national project, its ambiguous and fantasmatic character, entails affective investment and comes to produce and interpellate its national populations. In this I hope to show that, while the European national project in modernity may have come to function around heterosexuality (Alexander, 1994) , allowing homosociality through the banning of homosexuality (Cohn, 1998; Parker et al., 1992; Peterson, 1999) , heterosexuality as such is not necessary to the project of nationalism. In effect, what nationalism requires is the ability to continuously include its failures and attribute them to some 'foreign' element. One could thus say that queering is key to the national project, but not the exclusion of homosexuality.
In the second part, I interrogate how fantasmatic belonging in Israeli society interpellates queer populations through the double and ambiguous process of belonging and identification. I do this by analysing how the IDF have been reforming their policies with respect to LGBT soldiers and specifically articulating their progressive approach towards transgender recruits. I also interrogate the ways in which the political right in Israel is attempting to establish a 'proud Zionist' subjectivity, mostly within the ruling Likud party. I focus on the IDF as they are a key institution in Israeli society and because their ethos is inseparable from the Zionist fantasy. The analysis of Likud and rightwing politics is key here, since it is Likud that has been in power since 2009 under the premiership of Benjamin Netanyahu and because it is exemplary of contemporary Zionist-nationalistic discourses in Israel.
Part I: The National-Civilisational Edifice as Fantasmatic Belonging National belonging can be described as the effect of social practices, of habitual and performative bodily enactments by which the nation and belonging to it are rendered real. To paraphrase Butler (2008) , the various national symbols, annual memorials and celebrations -'invented tradition' (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2012) and/or a nation's 'world of significations' (Castoriadis, 1987, p. 359 ) -are acts and gestures performed on the outer surface of the body, the bodies of the national members and that of the national edifice (pp. 185-193) . These acts and gestures are then given internal and ontological status as if they arise from the nation's being in the world. The performativity of national belonging and narratives can also be located in the various discursive practices by which signifier and signified are fixed, albeit only temporally (Howarth, 2000, pp. 1-15; Laclau, 1996, pp. 57-58) , or how 'words and feelings' stick to one another (Ahmed, 2015) . Drawing on Berlant's The Anatomy of National Fantasy (1991), we could further point to the various practices and assumptions within a given national narrative that are shared by the national members and thus appeal and tap into people's sense of belonging.
The socio-historical making of nations and our sense of belonging, moreover, cannot be divorced from gender and sexuality. As Peterson (2013) explains:
…the hierarchical binaries of embodied male-female sex difference and cultural masculine-feminine gender differentiation were constitutive of early state-making, and taken for granted in modern (nationalist) statemaking and its colonizing projects. (p. 63)
Gender differentiation, therefore, contributes to perpetuating and increasing inequalities at the intersection of race, ethnicity and class. To Peterson (1999 Peterson ( , 2013 this is a 'heterosexist' or 'heteropatriarchal' system (see also Berlant and Warner, 1998) . The nation consequently emerges as a gendered and sexualised edifice rendered 'real' through, for instance, the production of women as mothers of the nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997; see also Å hä ll, 2012 and Gentry, 2009 ) and/or the military-nation as a hyper-masculinised site of nationbuilding (Kaplan, 2006; Nagel, 1998) . The gendered and sexualised national edifice has thus been able to constitute and interpellate populations through the continuous reproduction of patriarchal power relations and a complicated relationship of sexual prohibition and permissibility. A major example of this complicated relationship is the disallowance of homosexuality in which maleto-male bonding is nevertheless permissible (Alexander, 1994; Cohn, 1998; Peterson, 1999, p. 52) , especially in typically male and masculine sites.
Homonationalism: Sovereign Legitimation and National Inclusion
To Puar (2007) , however, contemporary national discourses, especially after 9/11, no longer exclude the gay from the national body. In effect, Puar and Mikdashi (2012) demonstrate how the 'quality of sovereignty is now evaluated by how a nation treats its homosexuals ' and, Puar (2013a) adds, 'how sexuality has become a crucial formation in the articulation of proper U.S. citizens across other registers like gender, class, and race, both nationally and transnationally' (p. 336). Puar (2007) names this 'homonationalism' as she demonstrates how queer populations in post 9/11 America and the west have become 'subjects of life' (Morgensen, 2010, p. 105) to be protected by the state, while the terrorist is rendered queer and othered. This is where the bio-political and queer necropolitical frameworks become most relevant, that is, in accounting for the ways in which homonationalism produces '… terrorist and citizen bodies' and how queer bodies become the subject/object of 'technologies of life' (Puar, 2007, p. 2, pp. 32-36) . To Lind and Keating (2013) , analysing queer inclusion and homophobic rhetoric in Ecuador, states may indeed pursue 'homoprotectionist' policies since they 'serve to consolidate national identity and legitimate the centralization of authority' (p. 512). Queer inclusion therefore works to strengthen state power and legitimate violence. In homonational and settlercolonial societies, as is the case in Israel/Palestine, this is further accentuated through the everyday practices of oppression, surveillance and bodily control (Elia, 2012; Ritchie, 2010) .
To explain the rise and appeal of homonationalism, Puar (2007) identifies three main apparatuses: 'sexual exceptionalism', 'queer as regulatory', and the 'ascendancy of whiteness ' (pp. 1-32) . By 'sexual exceptionalism' Puar points to the ways in which the USA (and other countries like Israel) projects and narrates its national excellence and superiority and how it co-opts homosexual bodies and indeed homonormativity in a global war on terror, while the Muslim Other is rendered sexually perverse and 'dangerously premodern' (Puar, 2013a, p. 336) . 'Queer as regulatory' refers to the ways in which an 'ideal queer' subjectivity, mainly white and secular and thus western, has emerged in the post 9/11 atmosphere. In contradistinction to this 'ideal queer' is the Muslim/Arab subjectivity who is in a 'race war' against homosexuality and a western imaginary of modernity and sexuality. The result is that the queer modality 'operates as an alibi for complicity with all sorts of other identity norms, such as nation, race, class, and gender, unwittingly lured onto the ascent toward whiteness' (Puar, 2007, p. 24) . The 'ascendancy of whiteness' manifests how homonationalism produces a queer subject that is 'fit for capitalism', a subject that is within the consumerist framework of western life and that embraces the 'American dream' (Koshy, quoted in Puar, 2007, p. 26) and is thus a demobilised, depoliticised and privatised subject (Duggan, 2002) . As such, the state's alleged benevolence is able to include the homosexual by appealing to existing socio-cultural discursive materials such as family, the nation, citizen and so on. The result of this, and indeed of homonationalism, is to allow and even embrace queer normativity, but only through the frameworks of nationalism, American-Western exceptionality and thus a normative-consumerist citizen worthy of life vis-à -vis the 'monster-terrorist-fag' (Puar and Rai, 2002) .
A Lacanian Reading of National-Civilisational Narratives
This article seeks to add to these manifestations and apparatuses of queer inclusion by directly interrogating the affective power of national-civilisational narratives. I suggest doing so by deploying tools from Lacanian psychoanalysis and Lacanian readings of nationalism and national belonging (Berlant, 1991; Edkins, 2003; Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006; Ž ižek, 2008, pp. 78-79) . Below I delineate the Lacanian framework as I explain the concepts of 'fantasy', 'desire' and 'jouissance', as well as the interpellating mechanisms of 'introjection' and 'projection'. Taken together, these concepts can further elucidate why and how the national-civilisational narrative, and in this case the Zionist narrative, has been able to hail queer populations in Israeli society and beyond in recent decades.
Let us begin by stipulating the psychoanalytic category of fantasy and, consequently, how national fantasies entail radical libidinal investment. Fantasy arises out of a need to cover for lack, the hole in one's sense of identity, and indeed in the imaginary wholeness of society. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, this is well captured in the mirror stage, the moment in a child's early development in which the child recognises him/herself in the mirror and in which human subjectivity is rendered both meaningful and incomplete. The mirror stage is
thus an alienating phase (Nobus, 1998, p. 117 ), because what the child sees in the mirror is both more and less 'real' than what they (and the adult person) can identify and identify with. The imago thus offers an '''Ideal-I'', i.e. as an I that can never be realized ' (p. 117; Lacan 1966 Lacan /2006 Edkins, 2003, pp. 88-89) . This is how and why the mirror stage helps us understand the logic of fantasy, a support of sorts for the incompleteness of social reality that is more and less real than society, the nation, the state or any form of imagined collectivity, and that precisely because of this must continuously aspire to recapture its being/becoming in the world (Mandelbaum, 2016) .
Fantasy or fantasmatic projects constantly aspire to account for the unpredictability, indeed the contingent nature of social life, by providing an ideal and reassuring blueprint for a fixed and structured world, a certain necessary utopia (Stavrakakis, 1999, pp. 99-121 ; see also Levitas, 2007) . In other words, fantasmatic projects hold out the future promise of fulfilment in which fantasy is realised and enjoyment is attained -although, as I explain below, fantasy is never fully realised or attained. The national-civilisational fantasy, nonetheless, should not be read as the antonym of 'reality'; rather, it is that which constructs and renders 'reality' possible -a reality that is contingent and in which society, the nation, 'we', is anything but a homogeneous symbolism (Ž ižek, 2001, p. 17) . This is because 'fantasy is basically a scenario filling out the empty space of a fundamental impossibility, a screen masking a void' (Ž ižek, 1989, p. 126) . To Edelman (1998) , it is only through fantasy that reality is rendered meaningful, since fantasy operates as 'an order, an organization, assuring the stability of our identities as subjects and the consistency of the cultural structures through which those identities are reflected back to us in recognizable form ' (p. 19) . Indeed, elsewhere Edelman (2004) argues that fantasy is the 'central prop and underlying agency of futurism' because fantasy not only attempts to stabilise the contingent, but '… compel[s] us to identify ourselves with what's to come by way of haven or defense against ego's certain end ' (pp. 33-34) . As such, fantasies and, here, national-civilisational narratives always include their own failure, which explains why the fantasmatic futurity has not yet been attained. As Glynos and Howarth (2007) put it:
Fantasy operates so as to conceal or close off the radical contingency of social relations. It does this through a fantasmatic narrative or logic that promises a fullness-to-come once a named or implied obstacle is overcome… or which foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable. (p. 147) Fantasies, moreover, are embroiled with jouissance, a libidinal and affective investment entailing bodily enjoyment that produces and interpellates populations (Laclau, 2006 ). As in the child's mirror stage, the fantasmatic national narrative always entails a plot in which enjoyment was lost, stolen or destroyed. These are the stories of national and civilisational golden ages, heroic pasts or major defeats and catastrophes narrating 'our' lost grandeur. The promised jouissance is thus 'always-already lost' (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008, p. 261) and is reinvigorated in the national utopia by the promise that it can be recaptured or reinstated through the establishment of national sovereignty, and by controlling (a specific) territory. The national-civilisation fantasy is thus an impossible-possibility that is nonetheless envisioned and as such has the capacity to hail populations precisely through its promise and the partial collective enjoyment it offers to its members. As Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras (2006) put it: 'the lost golden era of absolute enjoyment and the possibility of a return to this era is a chimera. However, the existence of this fantasy fosters the solidarity of the community, consolidates national identity, and animates national desire' (p. 153).
The promise of jouissance, however, is ambiguous and fantasmatic in the sense that it only offers partial experiences of belonging. This is vital to understanding the emotive hailing power of national-civilisational narratives as they strive to eradicate the gap, the lack in the nation's subjectivity, by offering partial modes of belonging, of limited identification with the Lacanian objet petit a as the object-cause of desire (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008, pp. 262-263; Ž ižek, 2008 ; see also Laclau, 2005, p. 112, pp. 114-115) .
The national edifice offers various such moments of partial enjoyment and satisfaction, such as in the event of a crisis, war and/or national celebrations, parades and memorial days. The national edifice is thus able to produce and hail its national populations through this partial experience of 'we-ness'. But this is limited, for any such moment of affective belonging ends with frustration, with a cry that 'this is not quite it', in which enjoyment was experienced, but very quickly lost again. Belonging was performed, only to be quickly removed from the libidinal economy once again (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008, p. 262) . The impossibility of the national fantasy and the jouissance that keeps the fantasy going -indeed, that animates it (Ž ižek, 2008, p. xxiv) -is directly linked to lack and gap in the existence of national identity. But this admission of 'our' lack is not recognised by the national edifice, for that would mean anxiety and paralysis. What the national edifice thus offers is a certain libidinal 'bribe' and trade-off. Through the constitution of the national body and bodies, the national edifice interpellates populations -that is to say, the national population introjects the symbolic order through myriad practices and performativities (e.g. national symbols, the flag, national holidays and commemorations, military service and so on) -whereas the lack and inability to fulfil the fantasy and obtain authentic and lasting enjoyment are projected onto the Other. This Other now stands for difference, for 'our' lack, and its existence is both a hindrance and a necessary explanation for why 'we' have not yet managed to secure and obtain our national 'I'm a proud Israeli' fantasy (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p. 147) . National fantasies, therefore, both promise us the satisfaction of desire, the obtainment of jouissance, security and fulfilment of 'our' national aspirations, and at the same time make sure this promise is kept at bay, unrealised. The reason is that identification can never be fully achieved; full belonging is impossible (Laclau, 1996, pp. 36-46) , and is thus transposed onto the future-to-come, while maintaining the Other as the obstacle, the explanation for why 'we' are not yet there:
This way enjoyment is kept at a ''healthy'' distance, not too far but not too close either; close enough to support the appeal of an object of identification but far enough from letting us entertain the vision of full satisfaction as an imminent possibility, something that would kill desire, induce anxiety and put identification processes in danger. (Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006, pp. 150) Reading national and civilisational narratives through the psychoanalytical categories of fantasy and jouissance might thus demonstrate how the inclusion of the queer in Israel and beyond operates not only as a mask, as 'pink-washing' (Britt, 2015; Elia, 2012) , but as part and parcel of the national Zionist edifice that 'bribes' queer populations into its 'world of significations' by promising a better, secure and free life, while at the same time ensuring that such fulfilment is impossible due to the threat posed by the Other: the Arab/Palestinian/Muslim. This claim does not mean we should dismiss forms of resistance to 'pinkwashing' and the effects Israeli homonationalism has on queer Palestinians (Ritchie, 2014) . Nor does it mean we should ignore voices of dissent within Israeli (queer) society and beyond, who resist the Zionist interpellation (Hilal, 2013; Pinkwatching Israel) . Indeed, we should critique Israel's own discourse for being inclusive of its (Jewish) queer population, while at the same time cutting funding for the LGBT community and halting gay rights promotion in the Israeli Knesset Lis, 2016) . Rather, my point here is to identify the ways in which the Zionist narrative is able to appeal to queer populations through a discourse of national and civilisational exceptionality that goes beyond the standard binary production of 'us versus them' (Zehfuss, 2007) . What I mean is that the process of national identification and belonging is complex and ambiguous as the introjection of the national edifice into the ego/subjectivity of queer populations is established through the '…perception of a common quality' (Freud, 1921 (Freud, /2001 , namely the insecurity of the Jewish-Zionist national body and its national bodies per se. This is why projection is intertwined with this mode of introjection as the insecurity of the Zionist body is deployed both as a way of interpellation, of queer populations, and as a way to condition the possibility for the re-imagination of the Zionist fantasy. Homonationalism thus functions here as a form of organisation of the libidinal economy of the Zionist fantasy. To further develop and demonstrate the operations of the Zionist homonational fantasy, the next part of the article interrogates the affective operations of homonationalism in Israeli society and within the broader context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Part II: Gay Zionism Pride in the Israeli Defense Forces
One way to interrogate the operations of introjection in Israel is to analyse the inclusion of LGBT people in Israel's major institutions such as the IDF. The IDF provide an excellent example, not because of the way LGBT soldiers are used to 'pinkwash' the IDF's daily oppression of Palestinians, but because the IDF operate in Israeli society and national discourse as a socialising site and a major part of Israeli-Zionist ideology -identification with which is necessary for anyone wishing to belong to the Israeli-Zionist edifice, the body of proper citizenry (Ben-Eliezer, 1995; see also Levy, 2008) . Indeed, as Kimmerling (1993) has demonstrated, there is no separation between the military, and the sociocultural and political spheres. The IDF and 'Israeli militarism tend to serve as one of the central organisational principles of the society' (p. 199). As I demonstrate below, this is how we should read the opening of the IDF, and the Israeli socio-political arena more generally, to LGBT; that is, not only as a strategy of 'pinkwashing' or 'nation branding', but as a continuous part of reimagining the national fantasy of Zionism in Israel. It is in this light that we can better understand how the national edifice is able to hail queer subjectivity.
The IDF are one of Israel's key socialising institutions, embedded in the national myth of heroism, fraternity (re'ut) and death (Kaplan, 2006; Levy, 2009; Zertal, 2002) , and part and parcel of the national everyday. Service in the IDF is mandatory for all citizens and permanent residents of Israel aged 18 years of old (with various exemptions) and is still very much in the national mainstream discourse. The IDF have undertaken various reforms promoting the inclusion of LGBT soldiers, especially during the 1990s and Israel's so-called 'constitutional reform' (Gross, 2013; Sapir, 2009 ). In recent years, however, the IDF have proactively started reforming their policies and raising awareness of LGBT soldiers' needs among their units. This fact further demonstrates how the IDF as a socialising site in Israeli society are reinvigorating the national fantasy through the inclusion of the Jewish-Israeli queer, by projecting the perceived threat of the queer body onto the body of the Palestinian-Other, and by marking those who critique Israeli practices from within as traitors (Mandelbaum, 2012) .
The recent case of a transgender officer in the IDF is illustrative of how the IDF attempt to interpellate queer populations through the promise of belonging and mainstreaming. The case is that of Lieutenant Shahar, the first openly transgender officer in the IDF. From his own account, we learn about the 'I'm a proud Israeli' process he went through first as a soldier, later as an officer cadet, and finally as an IDF officer. We also learn how these experiences affected IDF policy and their approach towards transgender people serving in the military. As Shahar has recently commented in an interview:
It is only a few soldiers every year, but transgenders are a special part in society worth fighting for. Today there are orders from above, good instincts on the ground and good will to integrate us. It may look complicated, but it is not -it is a moral choice the IDF had already taken the moment it defined itself the 'people's army' (IDF, 2015a).
Indeed, the ideal of the IDF as a national institution and key to equal and proper citizenship is re-inscribed in the military's policy of inclusion and integration of LGBT soldiers. As the Women's Affairs advisor to the IDF Chief of Staff (Brigadier-General Rachel Tevet-Weisel) has commented, 'the policy of the army is tolerance. Military commanders must accept everybody as they are' (IDF, 2015a). As such, what both Lieutenant Shahar and Brigadier-General Tevet-Weisel articulate and tap into is precisely the ideal of the IDF, and indeed part of their constituting identity as the 'people's army' (Zva Ha'am). The IDF are historically a major socialising phase in every Israeli's (mostly Jewish) life, taken in mainstream Israeli discourse as the defender of the nation and part of the traditional 'melting pot' notion by which a new Jew was produced (Almog, 2000) . Opening the IDF's ranks publicly to the queer soldier reveals again the affective power of the national narrative to appeal emotively and bodily to its members. This example demonstrates, moreover, how 'already available cultural and linguistic resources' (Weldes, 1996, p. 281) , namely the idea and myth of the 'people's army' in the Israeli-Zionist narrative, promise a sense of collective enjoyment and thus belonging to the proper body of Israeli citizenry.
A recent policy issued by the IDF with respect to same-sex couples with children serving in the reserve army further illustrates how the fantasy of belonging is promised to the queer subject through the IDF as a socialising site. According to the new policy, same-sex couples with children will not be called for reserve duty at the same time. As Major (reserve) Etai Pinkas put it: 'This new regulation means that in case of a national emergency -I know that my daughters won't be left at home without a parent. As a father, this is very reassuring ' (IDF, 2015b) . This new policy demonstrates how the queer body is rendered viable in the national-Zionist edifice precisely through the fantasmatic belonging the IDF enables as both a socialising and, in this case, liberalising site vis-à -vis Israel's enemies. The post on the IDF spokesperson's website also shows a picture of Major (reserve) Etai Pinkas and his partner, Major (reserve) Yoav Arad-Pinkas, in uniform with their three children. This picture further taps into the notion of the family unit as a key part of the national edifice, but one that is now not exclusively constructed around women as 'mothers of the nation' or the heteronormative family (McClintock, 1993; Yuval-Davis, 1997) , but also around the homonormative family and gay fatherhood as essential to the maintenance of the body-national.
Producing a 'Proud' Zionist Subject
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Israeli left is no longer the sole representative of LGBT rights in Israel and how awareness of, and political campaigning for, LGBT rights has risen in the Israeli right. Consider, for instance, the activities of the so-called Liberals in the Likud (a section of the ruling Likud party), as well as recent expressions by several Likud ministers and members of the Knesset articulating a strong right-wing and nationalist stance while at the same time deploying the liberal vocabulary of individualism and liberty.
1 One case in particular is that of the previous Minister of Defence, Moshe (Bogie) Ya'alon, the former IDF Chief of Staff. A clear supporter of the settlement movement in the West Bank who had objected to the unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005 (Levinson, 2009; Reuters, 2009) , he recently stated his position in favour of full legal equality for the LGBT community in Israel, including, among other things, same-sex marriage: 'I also think it is the duty of the State of Israel to assist members of the LGBT community to raise a family, have children, live according to their way, make a living, flourish and contribute' (Lamze, 2015) .
What Ya'alon articulates here is the power of introjection and the normalisation, indeed the nationalisation, of queer subjectivity. Speaking as Israel's Minister of Defense, a former IDF Chief of Staff and high-ranking member of the right-wing governing party (Likud), he offers a road to full societal integration precisely through the Zionist-national edifice. Moreover, Ya'alon's Facebook post, in which he is surrounded by military-security personnel climbing a hill, together with his own military record and his strong support of the settlement movement, project a national security image that is intertwined with full equality for and legal recognition of queer populations. The JewishIsraeli queer is able to 'flourish and contribute' precisely to the extent that they identify with this vision of the nation. Similar to changes taking place in the IDF, the above example further shows how it is the promise of national enjoyment that is key here. The security-orientated image that Ya'alon represents is now associated with and supports a national-civilisational narrative that promises such belonging and enjoyment: a partial experience of becoming a proud and proper Israeli.
Pride in the Likud, the LGBT caucus in the right-wing Likud party, further illustrates this homonational shift in recent years, and how the national fantasy has come to interpellate Jewish-Israeli queer populations. There is no longer a contradiction or tension in taking pride in oneself as a Zionist and nationalist, while simultaneously promoting gay rights. This new Zionist subjectivity is not 'I'm a proud Israeli' the outcome of a homonational Israeli state or society, but a mainstreaming and normalisation of the queer subject as a loyal patriot and proud Israeli.
Evan-Gary Cohen, the previous chairperson of Pride in the Likud, has clearly attempted to break the perceived tension between right-wing nationalist sentiments and homosexuality. In a blog from 2012, Cohen asserted that many Israeli gays do not identify anymore with the Israeli left, the traditional representative of the gay community in Israel, as the Jewish-Israeli gay identifies with and wishes to be a full and equal member in the Zionist national narrative. In his blog entitled 'Meretz no longer represents the gay community in Israel', Cohen (2012b) states:
… the LGBT community is not different in its support of the state than the absolute majority of straight citizens. And so, as a community and as individuals, it is time we stop apologizing to our enemy, foreign and domestic, to proudly declare -in its double meaning -our support for our state, for being Zionists and to fight for equality for the LGBT community as Zionists.
A homonational-Zionist subjectivity is most clearly visible in Amir Ohanah, the current chairperson of Pride in the Likud, and a member of the Israeli parliament. Talking in an interview in Haaretz in 2014, Ohanah displayed a typical hyper-masculine security-orientated image -an articulation of national pride, militarisation and a familiar Israeli security discourse -while also celebrating and promoting an LGBT agenda and raising awareness within the ranks of the Likud party (Haaretz, 2014) . Talking about his military service as an officer in the IDF and later in the Israeli security services, he comments that 'I cannot expand, it was about preventing attacks and it was hardcore', but 'they didn't make a thing out of it, nor did they discriminate against me, it also didn't prevent me from being promoted despite the macho image of the security services'. The hyper-masculinised image associated with Ohanah as a one-time agent of the security service is not contradicted by his homosexuality. Actually, what Ohanah tries to establish and tap into is the typical Israeli security 'tough guy' image, thus demonstrating that homosexuality is not foreign to the national-Zionist narrative and in fact can further strengthen it by promoting a liberal agenda in right-wing Israeli politics. Indeed, when it comes to the Middle-East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Ohanah clearly articulates a civilisational and racial worldview, asserting that 'the world is moving towards a clash of civilizations… like in the case of ISIS'. Furthermore, he legitimates the Zionist territorial aspiration over the entirety of Mandatory Palestine in clear ethnic/primordial terms:
There are 23 states for one people and 1 state for a second people. I don't care whether there will be a Palestinian state, or two. But not in our territory, maybe in Jordan or somewhere else… Judea and Samaria are for me the Land of Israel more than Tel-Aviv and Herzliya. This is the cradle of our culture, language, history… I cannot see a possibility to give away Judea and Samaria. (Haaretz, 2014) The legitimation of the nation, of the Zionist territorial and civilisational claim, is not merely a form of self-rationalisation, a claim for grandeur vis-à -vis the Arabs and Palestinians, nor is it an attempt to divert attention from Israeli actions toward the Palestinians. In fact, what Pride in the Likud illustrates is precisely how a so-called progressive-liberal agenda with regards to sexuality and gender is embroiled with the national and civilisational myth in contradistinction to the Palestinian/Arab/Muslim Other. It is therefore not merely a 'homoprotectionist' rhetoric that entails the protection of individuals based on their 'sexual orientation and gender identity' that we see in Ohanah's worldview, or in Israel's queer inclusion policies (Lind and Keating, 2013, p. 516) . Rather, we see a clear trade-off in which the state asserts its role as protector of queer populations in exchange for full support of the Zionist edifice.
It is in that trade-off that we find the national fantasy re-inscribing the obstacle as part of its own continuous reinvention. As I have explained above, national fantasmatic projects are ambiguous in the sense that in their inner logic they must always render a certain element and/or subjectivity foreign, constituting it as a threat or at the very least the reason why fantasy cannot be fulfilled: 'the identity of the evil ''Other'' who prevents the nation from recouping the enjoyment it has lost' (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008, p. 262) , or 'the obstacle which always perturbs the realization of our goals' (Ž ižek, 2008, p. xx) . In the process, national jouissance is re-ignited, although it now shifts from a focus on the 'foreign' sexuality of the nation's members -the disallowance of homosexuality as part of nation-building (Alexander, 1994) -to the 'foreignness' of the Palestinian body, which is rendered a civilisational threat and thus disables the realisation of the Zionist fantasy. There is an affective move, as the examples above illustrate, in the production and hailing of queer populations precisely through the fantasmatic function of the national plot. The declaration of national loyalty includes its own failure and impossibility at the same time as it participates fully in the militarised and securitised sites the IDF and the security services offer, and in the legitimation of territorial and political claims as the case of Ohanah demonstrates. The proud Zionist homonational subjectivity produced through the mainstream(ing) of the IDF and Pride in the Likud thus entails an impossible-possibility of national purity and dominance. This impossiblepossibility arises because of the civilisational threat the Palestinian/Arab/Muslim poses to the imaginary of liberal Zionism that Pride in the Likud seeks to promote. But this obstacle, this projection, functions also as a way to re-invoke and animate national desire and jouissance: 'bringing people together' through 'I'm a proud Israeli' the fantasy of Zionist-national unity and by transposing the threat of the Other from the internal ('perverse') sexualised body to the racially queered EnemyOther. What the inclusion of the Jewish-Israeli queer obtains, therefore, is the ability of the national narrative to reproduce the libidinal performativity around its symbolic institutions (proudly voting Likud, serving in the military and so on). The obstacle thus becomes not so much that by which the Zionist fantasy is constituted, the known 'self-other' dichotomy; rather, the Palestinian as the civilisational obstacle is actually the condition of possibility for the recouping of enjoyment, albeit partial, of the ability to partially and temporally enjoy Zionist unity. The co-optation of LGBT people in the service of the nation/state, moreover, has strengthened an 'internal' othering within Jewish-Israeli society by which critics of Israeli practices and policies are branded as traitors and extremists (Mandelbaum, 2012) .
The Zionist fantasmatic project, therefore, has an affective quality in the sense that it covers the lack and the split in Jewish-Israeli society and promises future closure and security. Simultaneously, it ensures that closure and security are never attained, precisely because any attempt at satisfying the lack in the Zionist body-national will reveal the split itself, the void behind the fantasmatic mask of the Zionist narrative (Ž ižek, 1989, p. 126) .
Conclusion
This article has engaged with Puar's analytic of homonationalism through the Israel/Palestine case, demonstrating how a psychoanalytical reading of homonationalism can further elucidate how the national-civilisational narrative is able to appeal and hail its (queer) populations and thus how it further complements the Foucauldian framework of 'biopolitics' and Deleuzian 'assemblage' that Puar (2007) deploys. Focusing on changes in the IDF's approach to LGBT soldiers and officers and on the rise of LGBT awareness among the Israeli political right, I have suggested that homonationalism entails an affective power of interpellation, a radical libidinal investment (Laclau, 2006) . By drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis and discourse analysis, I have argued that national and civilisational narratives are powerful forms of affective belonging, since they offer an ambiguous, endless and failure-based utopian future (Edelman, 1998 (Edelman, , 2004 . In other words, they are fantasmatic (Edkins, 2003; Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006; Ž ižek, 2008) . Therefore, fantasies always already include within their discursive coordinates their own failure, their explanation for why national congruency, fullness and security have not yet arrived. This is manifested in the obstacle, the Other 'blamed for the blocked identity' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 125; Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p. 147) .
In current homonational narratives in Israeli society, the Other has shifted. Today, the state and the Zionist national edifice offer Israeli Jews the ability to be 'Proud'. In other words, they offer a space to live one's life as openly gay and as a loyal nationalist -to celebrate gay culture and gay rights within and through the national prism and thus become part of the collective practices of enjoyment (e.g. serving in the IDF as a gay soldier/officer, supporting the rightwing ideology of settlement building). The threat, indeed the Enemy-Other, is no longer located in homosexuality as that which is disallowed by the state or society's symbolic order, but in that which wishes to hurt and destroy the State of Israel: the Palestinian/Arab/Muslim enemy. This is where we see introjection in action, the invocation of insecurity and a shared fate -what Freud (1921 Freud ( / 2001 defined as the 'common quality' (p. 108) -that all Jewish-Israelis face. This is an interesting move since it further illustrates how national fantasies require a certain 'foreign' element, but not as that by which they produce their own identity -the known 'us vs. them' dichotomy -but as that which provides the conditions of possibility for the partial enjoyment of the nationalcivilisational edifice through the queering of the Other.
between Zionism, nationalism and 'gay friends', as she puts it. https://www.facebook.com/ 118410851589072/posts/441005825996238, accessed 09/10/2015.
